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A Soft Solution for a Hard Problem: 
Using Alternative Dispute  
Resolution in Post-Conflict Societies 
James D. McGinley* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the immediate aftermath of war, justice will not wait for institutions.  
In anarchy, there is opportunity, but more importantly, there is opportunistic 
excess that thrives in a lawless vacuum unhindered by civil constraint.1  This 
is the quintessential Hobbesian moment where life is “nasty, brutish, and 
short.”2  The backbone of any attempt at reestablishing civil society is the 
reconstruction of a respected judiciary, but this takes time—and life will not 
wait.  It is against this backdrop, which often seems to more closely 
 
*  Partner (1996-2007), Of Counsel (2008-2015), Hiepler & Hiepler; Colonel, United States 
Marine Corps, Retired; J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law (1991); LL.M. National Security 
Law and Certificate International Arbitration and Dispute Resolution (CIADR), Georgetown 
University Law Center (2014).  As the Lead Litigation Partner, his trial work has been featured with 
a cover story for Time magazine, and the lead story for CBS news production 60 Minutes.  Colonel 
James D. McGinley retired from the Marine Corps after three combat tours and thirty years of 
service. As a naval aviator, he commanded HMH-769, the Titans, a CH-53E squadron.  In 2004, 
Colonel McGinley was selected to serve on The Joint Staff at the Pentagon.  In 2006, he deployed to 
Iraq, serving as the inaugurating Director of the al Anbar Provincial Joint Coordination Center.  In 
May 2008, Colonel McGinley returned to Iraq for a one-year combat tour as the Deputy 
Commander/Chief of Staff of the Iraq Assistance Group, leading Coalition Force efforts to train, 
mentor, and advise Iraqi Security Forces.  In his third and final combat tour, Colonel McGinley 
served as the Deputy Commander, Expeditionary Strike Group Five (FIFTH Fleet), conducting full 
spectrum expeditionary maritime operations in support of U.S. Central Command.   Colonel 
McGinley’s combat decorations include the Legion of Merit, and the Bronze Star. 
 1. DENNIS A. RONDINELLI, THE CHALLENGES OF RESTORING GOVERNANCE IN CRISIS AND 
POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES 1-7 (2007), http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/ 
documents/un/unpan025512.pdf. 
 2. THOMAS HOBBES, Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, as Concerning Their Felicity, 
and Misery, in LEVIATHAN (1651), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-
h.htm#link2HCH0013. 
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resemble a scene from a Mad Max movie3 than anything we know of reality, 
that Alternative Dispute Resolution may present the best hope for equitable 
solutions.4 
Depending on the type of dispute resolution techniques, their cultural 
acceptance, and the skill of implementation, there is a strong potential to 
dramatically increase the speed of stabilization by resolving differences 
before they lead to additional strife in an already chaotic environment.  It is 
this combination of simplicity, efficiency, and light footprint that makes 
Alternative Dispute Resolution a potentially powerful tool in post-kinetic 
environments. 
The kinetic phase of warfare reduces life for both combatants and non-
combatants to its barest element of mere survival.  Part II of this article will 
focus on the environment in the immediate aftermath of the kinetic phase as 
a shattered society faces anarchy, a vacuum regarding the Rule of Law5 and 
destructive opportunistic behaviors. 
Although different cultures may have disparate traditions of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, they all have as their goal the need to find acceptable 
solutions to significant disagreements.  Part III will examine the key 
approaches to alternative dispute resolution, with a brief survey of 
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.  Importantly, the article will also 
consider the need to evaluate the use of indigenous dispute resolution 
methods that may vary substantially from established Western practices. 
Modernly, there has been a greater focus on traditional Rule of Law 
efforts, specifically because of the need to create a high degree of confidence 
that justice will prevail in the formation of new institutions.6  After basic 
needs for survival have been met, this next step of resolving disputes is 
critical to establishing stability. 
However, it is important to contrast the limitations of transitional 
justice, and its focus on criminal adjudication, with the need for civil justice 
as society strives to reestablish the foundation of the activities of daily 
living.  Part IV will examine the challenges presented by the extensive 
process of recreating a judiciary, selecting judges, training staff, and 
building facilities.  It will also contemplate the consequences of approaches 
that simply reach back to pre-conflict norms, in spite of being very time 
 
 3. Robert Firsching, Mad Max (1979) NYT Critics’ Pick, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/movies/movie/30657/Mad-Max/overview. 
 4. The key techniques of Alternative Dispute Resolution that will be considered are 
indigenous dispute resolution, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.   
 5. “Rule of Law” is capitalized as a proper noun to describe formal Rule of Law initiatives 
undertaken to reestablish governance in post-conflict societies.  See UNITED NATIONS SEC. 
COUNCIL, THE RULE OF LAW AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT 
SOCIETIES:  REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 4 (2004), http://www.ipu.org/splz-
e/unga07/law.pdf [hereinafter REPORT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL 2004]. 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
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consuming, and risk being perceived as yet another competitor for scarce 
governmental resources.  This part points out that a simple reach back 
approach may be ill-suited to a full spectrum of conflict resolution, with 
little buy-in from unstable populations, and may test their patience to the 
extent of aggravating instability. 
The success of any transitional effort depends on the skill, knowledge, 
and expertise of the personnel who are tasked with implementing Rule of 
Law initiatives and their mission readiness.  This is especially true where 
there has been a severe breakdown in the foundations of civil society, or 
where there is still an extremely high threat of physical violence.7 
Part V will address coalition force capacity to cope with these 
challenges by providing trained facilitators and critical manpower support.  
Active component military attorneys, like members of the Judge Advocate 
General’s (JAG) Corps, often do not have any specialty training or 
experience in Alternative Dispute Resolution, and yet, they provide the most 
immediate legal resource to the commander in the combat zone. 
Part V will also suggest that coalition manpower management 
specialists should plan to source Reserve component attorneys with 
Alternative Dispute Resolution specialization, other attorneys from the State 
Department or equivalent coalition ministries, and trained negotiators to fill 
this critical gap.  Planners will also have to build force packages with 
sufficient security resources to source safe movement and operations 
throughout the battle space.  Typically, this will require transport 
helicopters, armored vehicles, associated logistic support packages, and gun 
teams to man personal security detachments for the movement of key 
Alternative Dispute Resolution personnel. 
The capacity of post-kinetic development is always dependent on the 
threat environment and must take into consideration the conditions on the 
ground in setting realistic goals to evaluate successful progress.  Part VI will 
explore a spectrum of transition scenarios matching resources to 
requirements and focusing on personnel that provide the best results in a 
given threat environment.  These scenarios include: “hot conflict” (still too 
dangerous for anyone but uniformed personnel),8 a transitional threat 
 
 7. See infra Part V. 
 8. In her concept paper for the World Health Organization, Judith Large defines “hot 
conflict” more conceptually, stating: “Hot conflict refers to the outbreak of violence, heated 
exchanges, riots or organised armed attack.”  Judith Large, Considering Conflict, Humanitarian 
Health Action, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 1997), http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/ 
hbp/considering_conflict/en/.  Here, “hot conflict” is used to indicate armed combat with major 
combat operations, as opposed to small, sporadic outbreaks of localized violence.  Id. 
3
McGinley: A Soft Solution for a Hard Problem: Using Alternative Dispute Res
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2016
 4 
environment (safe enclave, but defined by ungoverned battle space and 
perilous movement), and a steady state permissive environment (safe 
enclaves and diminished threat allowing ready movement with minimal 
additional security required). 
Importantly, Part VII provides several significant insights about the 
potential to optimize techniques to typical disputes, and considers these 
methods in the context of difficult transition challenges.  In particular, it 
includes a discussion of specific Alternative Dispute Resolution techniques 
and advantages in key situations, and posits an optimization matrix as a 
quick decision reference for battlefield commanders.  This analysis is also 
meant to provide a foundation for planners who may have to develop an 
interagency Request for Forces (RFF) to support the Combatant 
Commander’s requirement for Alternative Dispute Resolution resources as 
part of broader stabilization efforts.  In essence, if the sourcing and 
deployment of Alternative Dispute Resolution resources is meticulously 
executed, then the Combatant Commander’s success in transition will be 
dramatically increased. 
Finally, Part VIII concludes by focusing on the critical importance of 
the need to train like we fight by offering the suggestion that each part of the 
system should be gamed and exercised as an integral part of post-conflict 
stabilization and reconstruction.9  Critical to this effort is the realization that 
these issues transcend strictly military manpower and resources, and should 
properly be seen as “whole of government” issues drawing on interagency 
sourcing from across all of the resources available from coalition partners.  
This not only broadens the aperture but also allows multi-disciplinary and 
multi-agency solutions to better fit the entire spectrum of issues that confront 
coalition efforts to reestablish civil society. 
II.  BACKGROUND OF ISSUES CONFRONTING COALITION FORCES IN THE 
IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF KINETIC PHASE 
Although it can be difficult to describe or quantify the immediate chaos 
of life in war torn communities, anyone who has seen the pictures10 of 
 
 9. In its Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, the United 
Nations contextually defines the post-conflict environment thusly:  “The post-conflict environment 
in which disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) usually take place is often 
characterized by “poor or badly functioning economies, . . . insecurity and lawlessness,” and “a lack 
of social services and social cohesion.”  UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED DISARMAMENT, 
DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION STANDARDS § 2.20 (2006), http://unddr.org/uploads/ 
documents/IDDRS%202.20%20Postconflict%20Stabilization%20and%20Peace-building.pdf. 
 10. The classic images of the bombing of Dresden, or more currently, the rubble of destroyed 
buildings in Syria readily convey the utter destruction of war.  See Violence in Syria, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/photos/violence-in-syria. 
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destruction can readily understand the almost insurmountable problems 
caused by kinetic11 operations. 
A.  Anarchy 
In the immediate aftermath of armed conflict, societies experience a 
vacuum of social order that can be every bit as destructive and lethal as the 
hostilities that proceeded it.  During the spring of 2003 in Iraq, looting and 
violence became widespread and were followed by an even more 
devastating insurgency.12  In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, war 
raged from 1998-2002.13  However, even after a peace agreement was 
reached, the Congolese suffered an estimated 2.1 million additional deaths 
following the formal end of the war.14  The peril of lawlessness is affirmed 
in the Geneva Declaration report, The Global Burden of Armed Violence, 
noting, “Even more problematic, in some post-conflict settings experiencing 
fragmentation and division, armed violence can take on more anarchic 
characteristics.”15 
B.  Rule of Law Vacuum 
Post-conflict environments create a vacuum for the rule of law.  This 
breakdown of civil society presses humanity to the limit with all of the 
excesses of unbridled lawlessness.16  The entire range of criminal conduct 
including murder, sexual violence, theft, and intimidation can become the 
norm.17  There is often a deep-rooted mistrust of fledgling judicial systems, 
which may be viewed as corrupt or merely an instrument of revenge or 
 
 11. W.J. HURLEY ET AL., NON-KINETIC CAPABILITIES FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE:  FOUR CASE 
STUDIES, at ES-1 (2009), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA501354 (“‘Kinetic’ capabilities focus on 
destroying enemy forces through the application of physical effects.”). 
 12. LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROGER P. HEDGEPETH, AVOIDING THE LEVIATHAN: A STRATEGY 
TO LIMIT POST-CONFLICT NORMATIVE BREAKDOWN 1 (2013), www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA589280. 
 13. GENEVA DECLARATION SECRETARIAT, GLOBAL BURDEN OF ARMED VIOLENCE 52 (2008), 
http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Global-Burden-of-Armed-Violence-full-report.pdf 
(citing International Rescue Committee (IRC) data). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 54. 
 16. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP], GLOBAL PROGRAMME ON STRENGTHENING 
THE RULE OF LAW IN CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS: ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 4 
(2011). 
 17. Id. at 9.  
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retribution.18  Finally, it can be very difficult to harness military and security 
institutions that have been dominant in society during conflict and now are 
opposed to relinquishing absolute power in order to accommodate the 
balance required by the rule of law.19 
C. Opportunistic Behaviors 
Displaced populations are likely to return to “squatters” who have 
seized land, confiscated personal property, and seek to dominate essential 
resources like access to electricity and potable water.20  These returning 
refugees have immediate needs for food, water, and shelter, which create 
opportunities for criminal enterprises to extort these vulnerable populations 
as they try to survive the resettlement process.  It is also a turbulent time 
without established institutions to provide stability and order, and to 
constrain criminal behaviors that prey on the most physically vulnerable 
returnees. 
III.  KEY APPROACHES TO ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Ordinarily, transitional justice environments focus on remedies for 
criminal conduct that has occurred in the context of hostilities.21  As a result, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution methods frequently used in civil disputes are 
often less familiar to Rule of Law practitioners whose emphasis is criminal 
justice.  Although, an in-depth review of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
techniques is beyond the scope of this article, the brief survey that follows 
will provide the reader with the necessary foundation to understand the use 
of Alternative Dispute Resolution as the best post-conflict interim solution. 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. PATRICIA WEISS FAGEN, REFUGEES AND IDPS AFTER CONFLICT: WHY THEY DO NOT GO 
HOME 6 (2011).  The United Nations’ programs consistently cite land disputes as recurring issues.  
According to the UNDP, “At the same time, return movements can trigger disputes over land, water 
and property, and open opportunities of economic exploitation.  This, in turn, can aggravate existing 
problems of legal illiteracy, unemployment, marginalised and weakened statutory structures and 
traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.”  UNDP, STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW IN CRISIS-
AFFECTED AND FRAGILE SITUATIONS 9 (2011), http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/ 
dam/rbas/doc/Crisis%20prevention/Global%20Programme%20Phase%20II%20-%20FINAL.pdf. 
 21. The United Nations provides the following definition of Transitional Justice: 
For the United Nations, transitional justice is the full range of processes and mechanisms 
associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past 
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.  
Transitional justice processes and mechanisms are a critical component of the United 
Nations framework for strengthening the rule of law. 
UNITED NATIONS, GUIDANCE NOTE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: U.N. APPROACH TO 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 2 (2010) [hereinafter U.N. APPROACH TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE]. 
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A.  Indigenous Dispute Resolution 
The Western focus of coalition forces carries with it the risk of 
overlooking the obvious preference for Indigenous Dispute Resolution’s use 
in areas where local legal traditions provide a ready scheme for resolving 
disputes.  It is also important to note, that often Indigenous Dispute 
Resolution may involve some or all of the techniques embodied in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution. 
For example, in Arab traditions the rituals of sulh and musalaha focus 
on group reconciliation, even for individual wrongs: 
The ritual process of sulh usually ends in a public ceremony of 
musalaha performed in the village square. The families of both the 
victim and the guilty party line up on both sides of the road and 
exchange greetings and accept apologies, especially the aggrieved 
party. The ceremony includes four major stages: 1) the act of 
reconciliation itself; 2) the two parties shake hands under the 
supervision of the muslihs or jaha; 3) the family of the murderer 
visits the home of the victim to drink a cup of bitter coffee; and 4) 
the ritual concludes with a meal hosted by the family of the 
offender. The specific form of the rituals varies from 
Israel/Palestine to Lebanon and Jordan, but the basic philosophy is 
based on sulh, musalaha, musafaha (hand-shaking), and mumalaha 
(“partaking of salt and bread,” i.e., breaking bread together). While 
sulh resembles contemporary Western approaches to mediation and 
arbitration, a key difference is the relationship of the process to 
enduring communal relationships. Sulh does not merely take place 
between individuals, but between groups.22 
The specific benefit of looking to an indigenous solution is that it allows 
greater involvement of indigenous populations in the entire dispute 
resolution process, creating a sense of control and investment in the 
outcome.  This, in turn, can be expected to increase the confidence of the 
larger community that disputes are being promptly and fairly resolved.  
Finally, to the extent that each resolution is a product of local culture, 
traditions, and mores, it is more likely to be embraced as a final solution to 
 
 22. George E. Irani, Arab-Islamic Rituals of Conflict Resolution and Long- Term Peace in the 
Middle East, PALESTINE-ISR. J. POL. ECON. & CULTURE (2000), 
http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=994. 
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provide a genuine answer to the underlying dispute so the parties can 
permanently put their differences behind them.23 
Moreover, internationally, there is a greater expectation from coalition 
partners that local solutions from indigenous populations will be given due 
consideration.  This notion is reflected in Article 40 of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which states: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to access to and prompt decision 
through just and fair procedures for the resolution of conflicts and 
disputes with States or other parties, as well as to effective remedies 
for all infringements of their individual and collective rights.  Such 
a decision shall give due consideration to the customs, traditions, 
rules and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned and 
international human rights.24 
B.  Negotiation 
Negotiation, in one form or another, has extraordinary universality 
because it forms the basis of bargaining in the marketplace.  Ideally, this 
good faith approach to meeting, discussing issues in dispute, and proposing 
acceptable solutions will result in ultimate resolution.25  However, because 
negotiation styles, expectations, and norms are so deeply engrained in 
culture, the local parties to the dispute should play the dominate role rather 
than introducing the additional barriers of cultural misunderstanding from an 
outsider.26 
 
 23. The Australian Capital Territory sets out the following aims for its Indigenous Sentencing 
Courts in working with Aboriginal populations: 
Involve Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities in the sentencing process[;] 
Increase the confidence of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities[;] Reduce 
barriers between Courts and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities[;] Provide 
culturally relevant and effective sentencing options for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander offenders[;] Provide the offender concerned with support services that will assist 
the offender to overcome his or her offending behavior[;] Provide support to victims of 
crime and enhance the rights and place of victims in the sentencing process[;] Reduce 
repeat offending in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. 
Elena Marchetti & Kathleen Daly, Indigenous Sentencing Courts: Towards a Theoretical and 
Jurisprudential Model, 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 415, 432 (2007). 
 24. UNITED NATIONS, GUIDELINE ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ ISSUES 56 (2009). 
 25. 1 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 50 (3d ed. 2005). 
 26. Researchers who focus on the impact of culture in the context of negotiation expectations 
observe: 
Another application of the theory is in understanding differences between intracultural 
and intercultural negotiations.  Negotiators from the same culture, exposed to the same 
public cultural elements, will have a common set of chronically accessible constructs—
self-conceptions, metaphors, expectations, and scripts—making for an “organized” 
interaction.  Not so in intercultural conflicts, which inherently involve two negotiations, 
8
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Negotiation styles are often broken down into two distinct approaches: 
competitive and cooperative negotiation.27  In competitive bargaining, the 
negotiator often opens the negotiation with an extreme endpoint to shift the 
eventual midpoint of resolution in his favor.28  The basic outlook is seen as a 
linear zero sum game, with all gains resulting in an attendant loss for the 
opposing party.29  Importantly, this adversarial approach to negotiation 
naturally introduces a controlling element of mistrust by both parties.30 
In contrast, the cooperative bargaining approach sets a more 
constructive foundation with a more moderate opening demand and seeks to 
find a cooperative solution.31  Concessions are seen as a vehicle to build 
momentum,32 even if it comes at a price of a less favorable result.  The fact 
that the dispute is resolved may be every bit as important as the ultimate 
terms of the settlement.  Often, the issue of the dispute is less important than 
maintaining a strong, continuing relationship between the parties.33 
These contrasting styles are extremely important in post-conflict 
environments because desperation can evoke competitive negotiation just 
when more cooperative approaches would help build or preserve 
relationships, and help to ease any mistrust between the parties. 
C. Mediation 
At its essence, mediation uses the good offices of a third party specialist 
(mediator) to guide and facilitate the parties as their settlement discussions 
progress to resolution.34  By its very nature, mediation is enormously 
 
the original conflict over resources and the meta-level negotiation over the meanings that 
should define the event. 
Michael W. Morris & Michele J. Gelfand, Cultural Differences and Cognitive Dynamics: Expanding 
the Cognitive Perspective on Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 65 
(Michele J. Gelfand et al., eds., 2004), http://www.libvolume7.xyz/psychology/ 
bsc/semester6/managingbehaviorinorganizations/powerconflictandnegotiation/powerconflictandnego
tiationnotes2.pdf. 
 27.  GRENIG, supra note 25, at 51-52.  For a more expansive treatment of negotiation theory 
and strategy, see generally ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO 
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000). 
 28. GRENIG, supra note 25, at 51. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 52. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  See also CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., NEGOTIATION:  PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM 
SOLVING 89-100 (2006). 
 34. TANIA SOURDIN, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 26 (2d ed. 2005). 
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flexible and can be broadly adapted to address the variables of disparate 
cultures, varying issues, and independent personalities. 
1. Models 
Scholars in the field look to explain different mediation approaches as 
the result of analytical models that differentiate each style based on the 
underlying concept of the mediation.35  For example, in the Facilitation 
Model, the mediator serves as a conduit, gathering relevant facts and 
information, and then delivers the information to the opposing party.36  Here, 
the emphasis is on letting the parties work through their differences, with the 
potential buffer of the mediator in constructively presenting the 
information.37 
Usually, the parties are physically separated during this phase, and the 
mediator is able to calm the message with a careful selection of words and a 
constructive emotional attitude.  This may be the most important part of the 
mediator’s role because it helps to diffuse the tension and provides the best 
opportunity for each party to objectively evaluate the substance of an offer, 
rather than being offended by the tone. 
In contrast, in the Formulation Model, the mediator is expected to take 
part in the substance of the dispute.38  In this model, the mediator is an active 
participant in developing new solutions, but refrains from actually 
advocating a particular solution.39  It is these substantive contributions that 
differentiate the Formulation Model from the mediator’s role as a mere 
facilitator. 
In the Manipulation Model, the mediator is expected to go beyond the 
role of formulator and use all the advantages of power and leverage to 
“manipulate” the parties into a resolution.40  Here, the choice of labels is 
unfortunate because it implies something sinister; when in practice, it 
actually can be extremely helpful to the parties to have an active participant 
in finding resolution.  In the end, it is still up to the disputing parties to 
voluntarily accept or reject the ultimate solution. 
It is important to note that although analytical purists might prefer that 
the entire mediation be conducted according to only one model, in reality, 
 
 35. Lars Kirchhoff, Linking Mediation and Transitional Justice: The Use of Interest-Based 
Mediation in Processes of Transition, in BUILDING A FUTURE ON PEACE AND JUSTICE: STUDIES ON 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT 237, 239-243 (Kai Ambos et al., eds., Springer 
2009). 
 36. Id. at 240. 
 37. Id. at 240-42. 
 38. Id. at 240. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Kirchhoff, supra note 35, at 240. 
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each model is better understood as part of a spectrum or range of solutions.  
In situations where it is easy to build consensus, simple facilitation may be 
all that is required, but in more problematic disputes, it may be necessary for 
the mediator to progress using full leverage on each of the disputing parties 
to forge a resolution. 
2. Phases 
Briefly, an individual mediation event can be broken down into seven 
stages or phases.  Stage One is the mediator’s opening statement, setting the 
tone, identifying ground rules, and explaining the process.41  Stage Two 
opens the process to the parties’ statements, outlining their views of the facts 
and issues in dispute.42  Stage Three involves the parties’ identification of 
issues in dispute.43  Stage Four is a joint session where all parties meet 
together under the supervision of the mediator and get their chance to air 
their grievances directly to the opposing party.44 
During Stage Five, the parties privately caucus with the mediator where 
their concerns can be presented frankly, without fear of offending the 
opposing party.45  This additional opportunity to be heard can be a very 
effective way of diffusing tension, even though the opposing party is not 
present, because it allows the party to fully air their grievances.  At this 
point, the mediator can begin “shuttle diplomacy,” carrying the message 
from each private meeting with the opposing party, in an effort to find 
middle ground.46  Finally, when an agreement is reached in Stage 7, the 
mediator can assist the parties in reducing their understanding to writing, 
and bringing the parties together to encourage a better prospective 
relationship.47 
In understanding the process, it is important to note that Stages One 
through Three and part of Stage Five focus on the dispute and the problems 
in the past.  In contrast, part of Stage Four and Stages Five through Seven 
 
 41. GRENIG, supra note 25, at 93. 
 42. Id. at 95-96. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 93-94. 
 45. Id. at 94-95. 
 46. SOURDIN, supra note 34, at 29. 
 47. RUTH CHARLTON & MICHELINE DEWDNEY, THE MEDIATOR’S HANDBOOK:  SKILLS AND 
STRATEGIES FOR PRACTITIONERS 4-7 (Sydney 1995).  Of note, the stages or phases range broadly 
from three to nine depending on the author and the type of analysis, but the process varies little in 
what actually occurs.  See U.S. ARMY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERIES: MEDIATION 17 
(May 2010). 
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focus on the solutions in the future which will allow the parties to resolve 
the dispute.48 
D.  Arbitration 
Arbitration is sometimes characterized as a “private tribunal.”49  In a 
standard civil litigation context, arbitration may have many distinct 
advantages to the litigants when compared with the more cumbersome 
process of a judicial trial.  Importantly, the key drawback is that arbitration 
denies the parties the benefit of a jury to assist as a fact finder.50  However, 
this loss is often of no moment in cultures where disputes are normally tried 
before a tribal elder or a judge. 
Foremost among arbitration’s many advantages is its flexibility as a 
forum for dispute resolution.51  Every aspect of the proceeding has the 
potential to be individually tailored to maximize the benefits of resolution, 
while minimizing the process deficits that are typically associated with 
litigation.52 
If the tactical environment makes location an issue, then an arbitration 
hearing can be relocated to a secure location, because the key facility 
requirement is a hearing room with enough privacy for the parties to be 
heard without undue distraction.53  This approach stands in stark contrast to 
the usual facilities requirements associated with a traditional courthouse and 
individual courtrooms. 
Along the same lines, in its simplest form, an arbitration hearing can be 
held with a single arbitrator presiding, devoid of staff or counsel for the 
parties.54  This rudimentary approach is often not only more than sufficient, 
it may also harmonize very well with local traditions where a single elder is 
asked to sit in judgment.55  Arbitration also lends itself to streamlined civil 
 
 48. CHARLTON & DEWDNEY, supra note 47, at 7. 
 49. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 235 (1979), reprinted in ALAN RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE 
OF LAWYERS 599 (4th ed. 2006). 
 50. ARTHUR MAZIROW, THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ARBITRATION AS 
COMPARED TO LITIGATION 2 (2008), http://www.cre.org/images/my08/presentations/ 
the_advantages_and_disadvantages_of_arbitration_as_compared_to_litigation_2_mazirow.pdf. 
 51. SOURDIN, supra note 34, at 37. 
 52. Id.  For a detailed discussion of the key comparative benefits of arbitration when 
contrasted with judicial litigation, see Landes & Posner, supra note 49, at 599-600. 
 53. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 49. 
 54. GRENIG, supra note 25, at 173. 
 55. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has studied indigenous 
arbitrators in the context of forestry disputes, and provides the following insights reflecting the 
emphasis on judicial temperament and tradition: 
Indigenous arbitrators share many of the characteristics of mediators.  They tend to be 
prosperous male elders, often renowned for their speaking skills and sound judgment.  In 
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and evidentiary procedure, elevating substance over form,56 with less chance 
of prejudice (or the need for more complex safeguards) from the 
misinterpretations of a lay jury.  Finally, arbitration verdicts are generally 
designed to be final, without the attendant delays of appellate wrangling that 
can deprive the parties of any benefits or efficiencies from an alternative 
approach to dispute resolution.57 
IV.  TRADITIONAL RULE OF LAW EFFORTS 
Traditional Rule of Law efforts overwhelming focus on criminal 
conduct, often as the result of some of the most heinous crimes imaginable.  
In the meantime, disputes over property boundaries, rights to personal 
property, torts, and business disputes are neglected.  Unfortunately, if these 
ordinary disputes are left to fester, they can boil over into physical violence.  
From a governance perspective, this lawless vacuum can readily create a 
sense of societal chaos and hopelessness that slows the progress of 
reestablishing judicial norms.  These ordinary differences are the types of 
disputes that readily lend themselves to resolution through alternative 
means. 
A.  Contrasting Limitations of Transitional Justice 
The United Nations provides the following vision of transitional justice: 
“Transitional justice consists of both judicial and non-judicial processes and 
mechanisms, including prosecution initiatives, truth-seeking, reparations 
programmes, institutional reform or an appropriate combination thereof.”58  
 
many cases they possess formal or informal leadership positions.  Kpelle arbitrators, for 
example, commonly hold such influential roles as town chief or quarter elder.  In 
northern Somalia, the clan and sub-clan sultans often serve as mediators and arbitrators.  
The sultans’ process of arriving at a decision is often collaborative, allowing the 
disputants an active role in shaping a compromise.  Indeed, to be heavy-handed 
undermines a sultan’s authority, as expressed in a Somali proverb: “Three things bring 
the down of Sultans; biased judgment (in the settlement of disputes), dryhandedness 
(meanness) and indecision. 
Alfonso Peter Castro & Kreg Ettenger, Indigenous Knowledge and Conflict Management: Exploring 
Local Perspectives and Mechanisms for Dealing with Community Forestry Disputes, in 1 
COMPILATION OF DISCUSSION PAPERS FROM THE E-CONFERENCE ON ADDRESSING NATURAL 
RESOURCES CONFLICTS THROUGH COMMUNITY FORESTRY (1996), http://www.fao.org/ 
docrep/005/ac696e/ac696e09.htm. 
 56. MICHAEL KING ET AL., NON-ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE 108 (2009). 
 57. ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 
732 (4th ed. 2006). 
 58. U.N. APPROACH TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 3. 
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Analytically, there is a general sense that transitional justice focuses more on 
criminal responsibility for government abuses from an often tyrannical 
regime,59 than on civil disputes that may be considered less pressing in the 
aftermath of the devastation of human rights violations. 
The one area where transitional justice may overlap with civil disputes 
in post-conflict environments is reparations.  Reparations encompass a broad 
range of remedies including building memorials, providing health services, 
the return of property, and specifically the payment of monetary damages.60 
However, the emphasis is once again on the harm caused by the prior 
government, with little or no attention to civil disputes that have been 
allowed to fester for lack of a suitable forum.  The area of reparations is 
much more likely to address mass claims administration needs to benefit a 
broad poverty-stricken indigenous population than the individual disputes of 
parties to a civil action.61 
B.  Limitations in Current Rule of Law Approach 
At a conceptual level, the rule of law is an all-encompassing notion that 
societies should embrace justice under the law as an elemental “principle of 
governance.”62  Yet, this mandate is so broad that it risks losing track of the 
need for prompt fundamental mechanisms of dispute resolution.  As such, 
there is a defined risk that it can result in unacceptable delays or abject 
neglect of many of the elemental disputes that may impede the reinstitution 
of civil society.  In the extreme environment of post-conflict anarchy, there 
is the potential for “rough justice” or self-help remedies that aggravate or 
prolong the inequities of an already desperate society. 
 
 59. See Nicholas Rostow, Transitional Justice for Syria, NAT’L DEF. UNIV. STRATEGIC 
FORUM 1 (Sept. 2013), http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-282.pdf. 
 60. INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DISPLACEMENT: 
CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (June 2012), https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ 
ICTJ%20and%20Brookings-LSE%20Transitional%20Justice%20and%20Displacement 
%20Report.pdf. 
 61. Id. at 3. 
 62. The United Nations uses the following definition as a “Common Language” for 
understanding the Rule of Law: 
The “rule of law” is a concept at the very heart of the Organization’s mission.  It refers to 
a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and 
private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with 
international human rights norms and standards.  It requires, as well, measures to ensure 
adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability 
to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in 
decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal 
transparency.   
REPORT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL 2004, supra note 5, at 4. 
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The sheer magnitude of a Rule of Law project can be breathtaking, 
carrying the enormity of civil society reestablishment.  Policing functions 
have to be reconstructed with careful attention to staffing, training, and 
equipping.63  Typically, there are basic divisions to assist in elementary 
specialization and defined jurisdiction with examples such as local police, 
national police, border guards, and port of entry police.64  Each institution 
has immediate infrastructure needs, including buildings, transportation, and 
communications equipment.65  Finally, there are the attendant personnel 
administration functions, such as screening applicants for prior human rights 
abuses and payroll functions of salary based on shift scheduling.66 
Similarly, the judiciary has the same type of requirements for supporting 
infrastructure as other nascent institutions, but its need for highly skilled 
judges and clerical personnel can be especially difficult to rapidly 
reconstitute at the conclusion of hostilities.67  Often, the judiciary that served 
 
 63. In evaluating policing functions the United Nations specifically considers factors such as:  
Effectiveness and efficiency; Public confidence; Integrity, transparency and accountability; 
Treatment of members of vulnerable groups; Material resources; Human resources; and 
Administrative and management capacity.  UNITED NATIONS, RULE OF LAW INDICATORS: 
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE AND PROJECT TOOLS 6-7 (1st ed. 2011), 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/un_rule_of_law_indicators.pdf [hereinafter RULE 
OF LAW INDICATORS]. 
 64. For example, U.S. Forces in Iraq assisted with establishing a series of specialized security 
forces including National Police (later Federal Police), Iraqi Police Service, Traffic Police, River 
Police, Border Police, Oil Police, and Facilities Protection Services.  See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ: DECEMBER 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT 2008, at 43, 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Master_9204_29Jan10_FINAL_SIGNED.pdf 
(last modified Jan. 29, 2010). 
 65. Infrastructure problems were flagged to Congress during Iraq reconstruction efforts.  Id. at 
59 (“However, logistics, sustainment of ISF personnel, equipment distribution, infrastructure 
maintenance, and force generation continue to pose obstacles to long-term operational capability.”). 
 66. The United Nations Security Sector Reform provides the following guidance on the issue 
of prior screening to exclude know human rights abusers from serving in newly formed security 
forces: 
Human rights benchmarks and individual screening of past human rights records shall be 
established for all security sector personnel through vetting: those responsible for 
violations, including conflict-related sexual violence, are to be excluded from 
reconstructed security forces – including armed forces, police, intelligence services and 
national guard, as well as civilian oversight and control mechanisms. The 2006 UN 
Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) include modules on Women, Gender and DDR, and 
HIV and DDR.  Former female combatants should also be vetted before they are 
transitioned to security services. 
UNITED NATIONS SEC. SECTOR REFORM TASK FORCE, INTEGRATED TECHNICAL GUIDANCE NOTES 
53 (2012), https://issuu.com/cprundprsclac/docs/un_integrated_technical_guidance_no/1. 
 67. The difficulty of establishing competent rule of institutions is described as a period of 
years.  See, e.g., KRISTI SAMUELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES: 
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the prior regime is considered corrupt and abusive, so prior judges and staff 
may be distrusted to serve in a newly reconstituted judiciary.68  As a result, 
there can be a significant delay in screening, training, and installing new 
judges and their attendant support staff.69 
Prisons are typically the third key focal point for reestablishing the rule 
of law, and they are often uniquely vulnerable to abuse.70  In post-conflict 
environments, anger, grief, and a need for retribution can reach a destructive 
crescendo with prisoners providing a dangerous convergence of vengeance 
and opportunity.  Under these circumstances, it is more than reasonable to 
provide a critical level of effort to rebuild, train, and staff a nation’s prison 
system.  However, this endeavor becomes a voracious competitor for 
precious resources within the broader Rule of Law effort. 
C.  Extended Rule of Law Timelines 
Due to the enormity of the task, Rule of Law initiatives can often bog 
down, being perceived as slow, plodding, and often ill-suited to the full 
spectrum of conflict resolution.71  Afghanistan provides key insight as a case 
 
OPERATIONAL INITIATIVES AND LESSONS LEARNT, 37 WORLD BANK SOC. DEV. PAPERS SERIES 18 
n.34 (Oct. 2006), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/Resources/ WP37_web.pdf.  
 68. In considering the effect of corruption on the judiciary, Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman 
makes the following recommendation: “Review the training and integrity of law enforcement 
officers, military personnel, judges, and prosecutors.  This may involve mass firings followed by 
universal training opportunities (with testing) before people are hired or rehired.  International aid 
can help integrate former rank-and-file combatants with financial aid and training.”  Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Corruption and Post-Conflict Peace-Building, 34 OHIO N.U. REV. 405, 445 (2008). 
 69. The United Nations uses a very similar set of criteria in evaluating rule of law progress in 
establishing a judicial system: Public confidence; Access to justice; Effectiveness and efficiency; 
Integrity and independence; Transparency and accountability; Treatment of members of vulnerable; 
Material resources; Human resources; and [that] Courts and prosecution services have competent 
leadership.  RULE OF LAW INDICATORS, supra note 63, at 7-8. 
 70. Prisons get a few different key areas of scrutiny in no small part because of their inherent 
potential for abuse.  See id. at 8-9.  The United Nations lists the following areas of inquiry:  Security, 
safety and order; Prisoner health, welfare and rehabilitation; Integrity; Transparency and 
accountability; Treatment of members of vulnerable groups; Material resources; Human resources; 
and Administrative and management.  Id. 
 71. See generally REPORT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL 2004, supra note 5.  The United Nations, 
through its rule of law efforts, has substantial experience with the size and scope of the problems 
facing post-conflict states.  Id. at 1-2.  To this end, it is important to note the language used to 
describe such challenges, like “daunting” and “overwhelming”: 
And yet, helping war-torn societies re-establish the rule of law and come to terms with 
large-scale past abuses, all within a context marked by devastated institutions, exhausted 
resources, diminished security and a traumatized and divided population, is a daunting, 
often overwhelming, task. It requires attention to myriad deficits, among which are a lack 
of political will for reform, a lack of institutional independence within the justice sector, a 
lack of domestic technical capacity, a lack of material and financial resources, a lack of 
public confidence in Government, a lack of official respect for human rights and, more 
generally, a lack of peace and  security. Over the years, the United Nations has 
16
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol16/iss1/1
 [Vol. 16: 1, 2016] A Soft Solution for a Hard Problem 
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
17 
study in considering an extended timeline for meaningful implementation.  
As noted by the State Department, the broader Rule of Law mission is so 
extensive because “[t]he capacity of the Afghan justice sector is so low that 
most observers, including government of Afghanistan officials, talk about 
ROL development as being a ‘generational’ program, at best.”72 
In Iraq, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction also reached the same “generational” conclusion in 
analyzing the timeline for establishing a judicial system that meets 
international standards.73  The U.S. Government effort in Iraq for the period 
2003-2012 included a multi-agency task force with the State Department’s 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs designated 
as the lead entity.74  During those nine years, the United States “funded four 
programmatic areas at a total cost of about $197.9 million: judicial outreach, 
judicial development, judicial security, and court administration.”75 
Unfortunately, even as of 2012, the Bureau of International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs determined that the programmatic areas listed 
above were not complete and therefore could not provide end of mission 
reports to assist in the evaluation.76  In the end, the report concluded that, 
“deep, lasting institutional reform is a generational undertaking, requiring a 
sustained commitment and a long-term perspective to bring about permanent 
change.”77 
Moreover, without donor nation support, attempts at rebuilding civil 
society can suffer and quickly lose momentum based on the limited 
resources from the indigenous population.78  Festering insurgencies may 
 
accumulated significant expertise in addressing each of these key deficits. Departments, 
agencies, programmes and funds and specialists across the system have been deployed to 
numerous transitional, wartorn and post-conflict countries to assist in the complex but 
vital work of rule of law reform and development. 
Id. at 3. 
 72. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF INSPECTION RULE-OF-LAW PROGRAMS IN 
AFGHANISTAN 14 (2008), https://oig.state.gov/system/files/106946.pdf. 
 73. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, SUSTAINING THE 
PROGRESS ACHIEVED BY U.S. RULE OF LAW PROGRAMS IN IRAQ REMAINS QUESTIONABLE 20 
(2012). 
 74. Id. at 1-2. 
 75. Id. at 13. 
 76. Id. at 19. 
 77. Id. at 20. 
 78. Although the cited information that follows reflects the status of Afghanistan Rule of Law 
efforts in 2004, it is uniquely instructive on the issues confronting any organization involved in the 
implementation of Rule of Law initiatives.  See U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SPECIAL REPORT 
ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW IN AFGHANISTAN (2004), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/ 
files/file/sr117.pdf.  According to United States Institute Of Peace: 
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target new judges, specifically for the chilling effect of intimidation.79  
Unfortunately, attempts to hurry the process may be understood as “outside 
powers” imposing their will on a fragile society, risking little, if any, buy-in 
from unstable populations. 
V.  COALITION FORCE CAPACITY TO PROVIDE TRAINED FACILITATORS AND 
CRITICAL MANPOWER SUPPORT 
The great paradox of post-conflict environments is that just at the point 
where civil society fully breaks down, devolving into anarchy, is exactly 
when professionals of all disciplines are needed most to restore the basic 
activities of daily living.  As a result, Rule of Law initiatives often find their 
greatest initial hurdle to be foundational elements of personal safety and 
overall security. 
Stated another way, if the threat environment is too dangerous, then it 
may be nearly impossible to establish a fledgling judicial system to address 
the critical legal needs of a demoralized and exploited populace.  At this 
critical juncture, there is no reasonable expectation that attorneys or 
specialists from outside agencies such as the State Department, United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), various non-governmental 
organizations, and civilian coalition partners could be deployed into an 
extremely high threat environment. 
A.  Active Component JAG Officers 
Ordinarily, the Active component would be expected to be manned, 
trained, and equipped for such a high threat environment.80  Unfortunately, 
 
In 2003, the U.S. spent about $13 million on rule of law activities other than police, 
including support for the Judicial Reform, Constitutional, and Independent Human Rights 
Commissions.  (As insufficient as these amounts are relative to the needs of the Afghan 
justice sector, they make the U.S. the second largest donor to the sector.)  Money aside, 
relatively little political attention is being paid to the justice sector; the field has been left 
largely to “lead nation” Italy, which is widely seen as focused mainly on implementation 
of its own projects, rather than coordination of broader efforts.  As a consequence, and 
despite the presence of some Afghan officials who are committed to reform, since the fall 
of the Taliban little progress has been made toward building a functioning justice system. 
Id. at 5.   
 79. Commenting on the deaths of Iraqi judges the SIGIR Report notes that, “[s]ince 2003, at 
least 48 judges have been murdered, and the Justice official estimated that they have been able to 
provide security for only about 60 percent of the judges and their families.”  SPECIAL INSPECTOR 
GEN. FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 73, at 18. 
 80.  The Judge Advocate General’s Corps plays a critical role in the administration of military 
discipline.  See Mission Statement of the Military Justice Section, JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS 
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, U.S. ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, OFFICE OF THE 
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE, http://www.mdwhome.mdw.army.mil/sja_nav/military-justice (last visited 
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based on the usual career patterns (and youth) of the Judge Advocate 
General’s Corps (JAG Corps), the Active component JAG officer typically 
does not have significant professional experience in civil Alternative Dispute 
Resolution.81  Similarly, the Naval Justice School, which provides the Basic 
Lawyer Course for Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Judge Advocates, 
not surprisingly, does not include training in arbitration or mediation in its 
ten-week curriculum.82 
Further, personalities that have excelled in the sharply defined strictures 
of military law may be a poor fit for disputes that require extraordinary 
patience to build even a modicum of consensus.  However, as with any 
generality, there are notable exceptions, and to the extent there are Active 
 
Feb. 28, 2016).  The Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region U.S. Army Military District 
of Washington Office of the Staff Judge Advocate provides the following Mission Statement:   
The typical actions the Military Justice Section handles include: 
- Prosecuting violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in Special and General 
Courts-Martial 
- Assisting law enforcement during the criminal investigative process 
- Preparing and assisting in the adjudication of Non-Judicial Punishment 
- Drafting of Letters of Reprimand 
- Advising, preparing, and representing the United States in Administrative Separation 
Boards 
- Acting as a liaison between Commanders and civilian prosecutors 
- The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order 
and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military 
establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States. 
Id. 
 81. However, the United States Army does specifically mention the opportunity to employ 
Alternative Dispute Resolution techniques in the Recognized Alternatives to the Formal Court 
System section of its Rule of Law handbook.  CTR. FOR LAW AND MIL. OPERATIONS, RULE OF LAW 
HANDBOOK:  A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 105 (2011), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/rule-of-law_2011.pdf (“[Judge Advocates] should be 
aware of and consider the use of less traditional legal dispute resolution mechanisms.”). 
 82. The Naval Justice School provides the following overview of its emphasis on the 
fundamentals of military justice and operational law: 
Basic Lawyer Course: The 10-week course trains Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard 
judge advocates in the fundamentals of military justice and relevant civil law, with 
particular attention to administrative law, investigations, legal assistance and military 
justice.  Furthermore, NJS emphasizes trial advocacy skills required for new military 
attorneys to serve as counsel at courts-martial.  Navy and Marine Corps judge advocates 
also receive training on basic operational law in conjunction with the Basic Lawyer 
Course curriculum.  Graduates often return to NJS from the fleet for further training as 
staff judge advocates and for specialized schooling in trial advocacy, computer crimes, 
legal assistance, the law of military operations, and prosecuting and defending complex 
cases. 
Naval Justice School Curriculum, U.S. NAVY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS, 
http://www.jag.navy.mil/njs_curriculum.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2016). 
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component JAG attorneys that would be especially well suited for post-
conflict Alternative Dispute Resolution missions, they should be identified 
as a critical resource for expedited deployment when needed. 
B.  Reserve Component Attorneys with Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Specialization 
In contrast to their Active component counterparts, Reserve component 
attorneys in civil practice are highly likely to have Alternative Dispute 
Resolution expertise as a necessary part of their practice.  Depending on the 
state, many jurisdictions require some form of non-binding Alternative 
Dispute Resolution as part of their case management systems in an effort to 
decrease court caseloads.83  These approaches vary widely by jurisdiction, 
but typically include mandatory settlement conferences, non-binding 
arbitration, and mediation. 
This unique blend of full combat functionality, coupled with Alternative 
Dispute Resolution skill, knowledge, training, and expertise makes the use 
of Reserve attorneys in high threat environments the best bridging strategy 
in the combat zone.  Their competency and currency are derived from their 
professional civilian careers and their continued, year-round periodic 
military training provide their combat abilities. 
The Department of Defense could readily track both core Alternative 
Dispute Resolution competencies and currencies through its existing 
Civilian Employment Information Program (CEI) database, thereby 
providing a ready reference for manpower planners to meet contingency 
staffing requirements.84 
 
 83. The local rules for the United States District Court, Central District of California are 
illustrative of typical rules requiring the parties to pursue resolution of the case through some form 
of Alternative Dispute Resolution.  Note that in the Central District the obligation to attempt 
resolution through Alternative Dispute Resolution is mandatory.  L.R. 16-15 Policy Re Settlement & 
ADR.  It is the policy of the Court to encourage disposition of civil litigation by settlement when 
such is in the best interest of the parties.  The Court favors any reasonable means to accomplish this 
goal.  Nothing in this rule shall be construed to the contrary.  The parties are urged first to discuss 
and to attempt to reach settlement among themselves without resort to these procedures.  It is also 
the policy of the Court that unless an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Procedure is selected by 
the parties, the judge assigned to preside over the civil case (the trial judge) may participate in 
facilitating settlement.  L.R. 16-15.1 Proceedings Mandatory.  Unless exempted by the trial judge, 
the parties in each civil case shall participate in one of the ADR Procedures set forth in this rule or as 
otherwise approved by the trial judge.  C.D. Cal. R. 16-15, 16-15.1 (based on the authority of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 16). 
 84. Master Sergeant Bob Haskell, Reserve Component Civilian Employment Information 
Program Begins, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Mar. 31, 2004), 
http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=26978 (“The database is called the Civilian 
Employment Information Program, and it is the way for all Guard and Reserve members to comply 
with the law that requires them to inform DoD of who employs them and how they are employed 
20
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C.  State Department Attorneys and Trained Negotiators 
As the threat decreases and basic stability operations take hold, Rule of 
Law efforts should progress beyond a primary effort by uniformed combat 
capable personnel.  At this point, coalition force leadership should shift the 
emphasis to a whole of government approach. 
At its essence, rule of law is a governance issue, which would suggest 
that in the context of the United States, the State Department should take the 
lead at the earliest opportunity, based on improvements in security and gains 
in stabilization. 
It should also be noted that this does not mean the environment needs to 
be absolutely devoid of any personal risk of physical danger, but rather, 
there should be sufficient security so that non-combatants can move and 
function with a fair expectation of their own personal safety.  In fact, State 
Department personnel in both Iraq and Afghanistan have acquitted 
themselves very well, facing dangerous environments on a daily basis, as 
they worked to reestablish civil society. 
In Afghanistan, the State Department’s Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) provides critical support for 
Rule of Law efforts “by helping the Afghan government to develop a formal 
justice sector with efficient, capable, and independent legal institutions, and 
by helping Afghan citizens to access justice mechanisms and understand 
their legal rights.”85 
Ideally, the State Department would program Alternative Dispute 
Resolution initiatives at the outset of their broader long-term Rule of Law 
efforts to provide a “quick win” in initial civil society calming efforts.  
Although there is significant civilian Alternative Dispute Resolution 
expertise and capacity resident within the federal government,86 this is an 
 
when not performing their military duties.”).  See also 10 U.S.C. § 10204(a)(4) (2006) (requiring 
that the Secretary maintain current records of a Reservist’s “[c]ivilian occupational skills”). 
 85. Rule of Law Programs in Afghanistan Fact Sheet, STATE.GOV, 
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/189320.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2013).  However, it is important to 
make the distinction that the thrust of this effort is primarily criminal justice with an emphasis on 
major crimes, gender justice, and long-term legal education.  Id. (sponsoring Afghan scholars to 
come to the United States to study for advanced law degrees). 
 86. The Interagency Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Working Group consists of nearly 
100 federal cabinet agencies, sub-agencies, and independent agencies within the United States 
government that defines itself as follows:  “We are the central forum and resource for information 
about the federal government’s use of ADR.  We advance the use of ADR through:  Coordination of 
multi-agency initiatives; Promotion of best practices and programs; Dissemination of policy and 
guidance.”  Interagency Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Working Group, ADR.GOV, 
http://www.adr.gov/index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2015). 
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area that would readily lend itself to outside contracting to provide trained 
personnel on a task organized, ad hoc basis to meet the specific requirements 
of the mission. 
D.  Allocating Sufficient Security Resources to Source Safe Movement and 
Operations Throughout the Battle Space 
Although recent coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have included 
significant logistical planning for life support areas to sustain additional non-
military personnel with showers, lavatories, dining facilities and sleeping 
quarters, secure transportation can be problematic.87  Moreover, American 
experiences with contracted security like Blackwater USA have proven 
mixed at best.88  The use of lethal force by private contractors can raise 
significant legal issues, provide an unnecessary source of friction with the 
local populace, and cause severe command and control concerns for 
coalition forces because contractors often operate outside of the established 
military chain of command.89 
In contrast, if military manpower planners are tasked with sourcing and 
providing military personnel to handle personal security detachment (PSD) 
missions, and the overall mission of providing movement to alternative 
dispute personnel is designed into the larger rebuilding governance effort, 
then this critical element will be properly supported.  This would have the 
advantage that PSD ground movements in the battle space would be fully 
coordinated, and any aviation requirements, typically for tactical helicopter 
movements, would also be fully coordinated to make best use of all available 
assets.  However, this level of support must be built-in from the start as part 
of the fundamental planning assumptions, with sourcing tracked into the 
various different planning documents and databases like the Global Force 
Management process.90 
E.  Alternative Dispute Resolution in Action—Hypothetical Relief for 
Moldova and Transnistria 
For purposes of this hypothetical, the reader is asked to assume that 
border tensions between Moldova and Transnistria have festered for years 
 
 87. Matt Apuzzo, Ex-Blackwater Guards Given Long Terms for Killing Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/us/ex-blackwater-guards-sentenced-to-prison-
in-2007-killings-of-iraqi-civilians.html.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Jennifer K. Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40991.pdf. 
 90. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 5-0: JOINT OPERATION PLANNING, at H-1 
(2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf. 
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and, with a new “Russian Spring,” have boiled over into a devastatingly 
violent internal conflict.  Inspired by events in Crimea and the Ukraine, a 
coalition of Cossacks, ethnic Russians in Moldova, Transnistrians, and 
unidentified outside fighters (likely supported with arms, training, and 
financing by Russia), have engaged in a ruthless insurgency that has brought 
Moldova to the verge of anarchy.  At the heart of this conflict are claims of 
disputed territory lost during the War of Transnistria in 1990. 
The damage has been extraordinary, and after the Russians cut off 
Moldova’s supply of petroleum, coal, and natural gas, even a mild winter 
was too much for almost a third of its three million inhabitants who fled the 
violence, food shortages, and lack of electricity. 
Eventually, through a series of difficult capitulations, Moldova has lost 
almost half of its territory, but the conflict has settled down to the point that 
the United States and the European Union member states have started to 
fund Moldova’s reconstruction.  Although there is some shockingly lethal 
violence from zealots on both sides that refuse to give up the fight, the 
former refugees have come streaming back, worried that if they do not re-
stake their property claims squatters will take everything they own. 
Vowing not to repeat the mistakes of the prior administration in the 
Ukraine in 2014, the new President has rapidly moved U.S. troops into 
Moldova in a robust “partnering” effort.  The President is confident that the 
Europeans will eventually commit both troops and funding, but there have 
been a series of delays in negotiations that have hindered the European 
response. 
The American Task Force Commander (based on the advice of his 
senior staff JAG officer) has ordered a two-pronged approach to re-establish 
the Moldovan justice system.  First, in conjunction with Rule of Law experts 
at the United Nations and the American Bar Association, there would be a 
primary effort to recreate the Moldovan Judiciary with an immediate focus 
on the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed during the 
conflict.  Given the enormity of the task, he was advised that this effort 
might take several years to make foundational progress and would not meet 
international standards for another 15-20 years. 
Second, the Commander directed a comprehensive Alternative Dispute 
Resolution effort to head off violence over internal civil disputes.  Staff 
estimates for this second prong projected that many of the functions usually 
handled in civil courts could be fully functioning within ninety days and 
would provide immediate relief as a bridging strategy over the next 3-5 
years. 
At the outset, the deadly combination of Russian trained snipers and 
improvised explosive devices proved to be a stubbornly lethal combination.  
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At that point in time, the Force Protection Officer recommended that 
personnel movements be restricted to uniformed military only.  In response, 
the Task Force Commander deployed primarily reserve officers with 
extensive mediation and arbitration experience.  Fortunately, they were very 
successful in mediating property disputes between squatters and rightful 
owners.  As a relief valve, the Moldovan government agreed to provide land 
grants to squatters if they promptly re-settled. 
Thereafter, as security improved, the sheer volume of construction 
contracts caused contracting disputes between the various contractors, 
suppliers, and subcontractors.  Infrastructure projects like power plants, 
highways, and schools dominated the initial reconstruction efforts.  
Importantly, the Moldovans who are typically suspicious of outsiders, 
showed a clear preference for Swiss arbitrators.  As a result, the Task Force 
Commander established a secure enclave for the Swiss (nicknamed Little 
Geneva), where the parties traveled to have their disputes resolved.  
Thankfully, there was a true sense of urgency by all parties, because many 
massive reconstruction projects had come to a grinding halt as these 
construction disputes cropped up. 
Finally, after two years, a significant number of Moldovan attorneys 
have been cross-trained in Alternative Dispute Resolution and have stepped 
in to handle all but the most complex arbitrations.  When large sums of 
money are involved, the Moldovans still look to the Swiss, with many 
Moldovan corporations continuing to use arbitration in lieu of the newly 
established Moldovan civil courts.  Throughout the development process, the 
Task Force Commander was complimented for defusing violence caused by 
civil disputes, the speed of dispute resolution, and the deep sense of fairness 
in the result experienced by a society that had become cynical from 
protracted corruption. 
VI.  SPECTRUM OF TRANSITION SCENARIOS—MATCHING RESOURCES IN A 
GIVEN THREAT ENVIRONMENT 
When viewed as a spectrum, the assignment of trained personnel to 
assist in developing an Alternative Dispute Resolution program has an 
inverse relationship with the threat environment.  In the extreme, when 
existence is defined solely by combat, there is little need for civil dispute 
resolution because life has sunk to the most basic elements of survival.91  At 
 
 91. The International Committee of the Red Cross often plays a unique role in aiding civilian 
populations during times of war and unfortunately bears witness to some of the horrors.  The excerpt 
below provides dramatic insight into the devastating effects of war on civilian populations especially 
women and children: 
Women increasingly bear the brunt of conflicts in which they rarely play a part.  Like 
other civilians caught up in the maelstrom of war, they face shelling, famine, epidemics, 
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the other extreme, there is sufficient security and stability that issues beyond 
ordinary street crime are no longer controlling factors for program 
development.  The artful part of reestablishing civil society comes from 
successfully adapting to the threats and circumstances between the extremes. 
A.  Hot Conflict (still too dangerous for anyone but uniformed personnel) 
In insurgent environments like Iraq and Afghanistan, the threat may 
remain extremely high even after a technical cessation of hostilities.  Under 
these circumstances, the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution qualified 
attorneys and specialists from the Reserve component would provide 
technical expertise with full combat functionality.  As a forcing function, 
moving quickly to reestablish these foundations of civil society with 
immediate relief for pre-existing disputes would hasten the sense of a return 
to normalcy, obviate the need for self-help justice, and begin to establish 
confidence in follow-on governance. 
B.  Transitional Threat Environment (safe enclave, but defined by 
ungoverned battle space and perilous movement) 
At the outset in a transitional threat environment, civilian Alternative 
Dispute Resolution is best accommodated by fixed-base operations.  This 
approach enables a rapid hand-off from purely military facilitators, but does 
not expose non-combatants to an unnecessary risk of harm.  As key 
government centers are reestablished, planners should consider the 
possibility of locating landing zones nearby to allow movement by tactical 
aircraft.  Air movement capitalizes on an opportunity to bypass local ground 
threats by shuttling key personnel between and among safe enclaves. 
However, working from built-up enclaves should be seen as a 
transitional approach because it comes with real limitations in accessibility 
to the local populace.  By its very nature, dispute resolution is a people 
 
forced displacement, detention, torture and execution.  But women are also subjected to 
additional suffering[,] which they endure with courage and dignity.  In many cases, when 
a conflict breaks out women find themselves the sole breadwinner and pillar of the 
family, taking care not only of their children but also of elderly parents.  They repeatedly 
risk their lives while searching for water and food or collecting wood in areas infested 
with mines or under constant shelling.  Family unity often depends on these women who 
greatly contribute to human and social survival. 
Civilians in War, ICRC.ORG (Jan. 10, 1995), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/ 
documents/misc/57jmkz.htm. 
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business and must be co-located as a matter of convenience with major 
populations in order to be readily accessible. 
C.  Steady State Permissive Environment: Safe Enclaves, and Diminished 
Threat Allowing Ready Movement with Minimal Additional Security 
Required 
Once a steady state permissive environment is achieved, to the greatest 
extent possible, the original military effort should rapidly shift to a whole of 
government approach.92  This creates a greater sense of calm and stability, as 
well as reduces any unspoken intimidation that is inherent in the presence of 
armed combatants in uniform. 
As security and stability increase, this drawdown of coalition forces 
should eventually result in a purely civilian Alternative Dispute Resolution 
effort with little, if any, support required from the military.  At this point, the 
final transition should be from international facilitators to an entirely 
indigenous endeavor. 
Importantly, all of the gains that have been achieved in implementing 
and utilizing Alternative Dispute Resolution techniques should be 
institutionalized, so that they are not lost in the final phase of transition.  
 
 92. The Obama Administration reportedly issued Presidential Policy Directive Number 23 on 
Security Sector Assistance, which sets out rule of law and support for justice sector institutions as 
enumerated goals.  Specifically, the Fact Sheet which was released to the public states: 
The principal goals of our security sector assistance are to:  
1. Help partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges, 
specifically to: disrupt and defeat transnational threats; sustain legitimate and effective 
public safety, security, and justice sector institutions; support legitimate self-defense; 
contribute to U.S. or partner military operations which may have urgent requirements; 
maintain control of their territory and jurisdiction waters including air, land, and sea 
borders; and help indigenous forces assume greater responsibility for operations where 
U.S. military forces are present.  
2. Promote partner support for U.S. interests, through cooperation on national, regional, 
and global priorities, including, but not limited to, such areas as: military access to 
airspace and basing rights; improved interoperability and training opportunities; and 
cooperation on law enforcement, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, combating 
organized crime and arms trafficking, countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 
proliferation, and terrorism, intelligence, peacekeeping, and humanitarian efforts.  
3. Promote universal values, such as good governance, transparent and accountable 
oversight of security forces, rule of law, transparency, accountability, delivery of fair and 
effective justice, and respect for human rights.  
4. Strengthen collective security and multinational defense arrangements and 
organizations, including by helping to build the capacity of troop- and police-contributing 
nations to United Nations and other multilateral peacekeeping missions, as well as 
through regional exercises, expert exchanges, and coordination of regional intelligence 
and law enforcement information exchanges.  
Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, WHITE HOUSE 
(Apr. 5, 2013), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ssa.pdf. 
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There is a strong tendency to try to restore judicial systems to their prior 
state at the conclusion of hostilities because it is the “way it has always been 
done.”  This approach squanders the hard-won knowledge and skills of new 
mediators and arbitrators, wasting the opportunity for genuine, permanent 
improvement as part of the judicial reset. 
VII.  OPTIMIZING TECHNIQUES TO DISPUTES AND TRANSITION CHALLENGES 
In analyzing the use of specific Alternative Dispute Resolution 
techniques, and their relative advantages in key situations, it is important to 
understand that high threat environments favor simplicity.  Complexity adds 
personnel, creates additional logistical requirements, and increases 
movement security difficulties.  As a result, it is this unique blend of 
sufficient problem solving capacity, coupled with a light footprint, which 
makes Alternative Dispute Resolution an especially valuable tool in post-
conflict environments. 
That said, even within the realm of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
there are clear differences between methods that make one technique more 
suitable than others for a given threat condition.  Typically, the spectrum of 
support required in terms of personnel, facilities and transportation runs 
from negotiation to mediation, and then to arbitration. 
Obviously, these are broad generalizations, but negotiation can be 
conducted in very austere conditions, and may be supported with as little as 
one facilitator.93  In contrast, ideally mediation favors a facility with the 
capacity for a joint session and caucus rooms, and requires a trained 
mediator to get the most out of the process.94  Here, the need for a facility 
should not be constrained any further than the creative field expedients of 
tents, separate vehicles, or a series of clearings in the woods.  Nevertheless, 
mediation is still a more involved process than elemental negotiations, with 
slightly greater overhead. 
 
 93. UNITED NATIONS, GUIDANCE NOTE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON DEMOCRACY 5 
(2009), http://www.un.org/democracyfund/sites/www.un.org.democracyfund/files/file_attach/ 
UNSG%20Guidance%20Note%20on%20Democracy-EN.pdf.  Political facilitation can take many 
forms, including mediation and negotiation, convening forums for policy discussion, supporting 
inclusive processes and national dialogue based on democratic values and principles. This can help 
lower tensions and stabilize political discourse, thereby easing the way to democratic transition and 
consolidation.  The UN, with its ability to provide support in an impartial manner, is particularly 
well placed to play this role.  Id. 
 94. See generally DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, AIR FORCE 
MEDIATION COMPENDIUM:  HOW TO MEDIATE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WORKPLACE DISPUTES (3d ed. 
Sep. 2004), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/adr/af-mediation-compendium2004.pdf.  
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At the other end of the spectrum is arbitration.  Arbitration is best served 
with a significantly more stable environment and should properly be sourced 
with counsel for all parties and one or more trained arbitrators.  Arbitration 
may involve written motions, formal rules of evidence, and is greatly 
facilitated with some support staff.95  Although none of these issues 
represent a hard and fast rule, it is fair to surmise that of the three dispute 
resolution techniques mentioned, arbitration requires the greatest support.  
The following optimization matrix at Table 1 provides a compact guide as a 
starting point for considering which dispute resolution method may work 
best in a particular threat environment. 
 
Table 1.  Alternative Dispute Resolution Threat Optimization Matrix 
Assumption: Initially, local tensions are too extreme to accommodate resolution by 
an indigenous tribunal.  Note: Alternative Dispute Resolution techniques remain 
useful across the entire threat spectrum. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 Undoubtedly, there are clear gains for coalition forces if they plan 
and implement a bridging strategy utilizing Alternative Dispute Resolution 
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as a transitional path to speed the reestablishment of the institutions of civil 
justice. 
More specifically, by embracing a new paradigm for conflict resolution 
in societies facing anarchy in the immediate aftermath of kinetic hostilities, 
the speed and success of governance initiatives will be dramatically 
increased.  Currently, coalition forces (often the U.S. and other partners) 
have well-developed Rule of Law initiatives, but these efforts require a 
protracted period of time to construct, can be extremely difficult to 
adequately staff, and often slow the progress of reestablishing civil society 
in post-kinetic environments. 
From a military point of view, the Rule of Law initiatives must be 
directed at criminal law in order to create a sense of security within the local 
populace.  However, when there is a substantial insurgency, and security 
efforts may take a period of years, every other aspect of the activities of 
daily living must also be simultaneously addressed to speed recovery efforts 
during the rebuilding phase.  Too often, these other aspects of civil society 
are considered a low priority, and as a result, are neglected, hindering 
broader efforts in reestablishing the rule of law.  Further, military planners 
should write Alternative Dispute Resolution scenarios into tabletop and field 
exercises, so that combatant commanders and their staffs reflexively 
integrate these techniques into their post-conflict operations. 
Importantly, Alternative Dispute Resolution efforts should be 
programmed to run concurrently with an overarching Rule of Law initiative, 
as opposed to supplanting it.  This line of reasoning recognizes the benefits 
of reestablishing a fully functioning judiciary as a stabilizing societal factor, 
while harmonizing the expediency and efficiency of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution to fill the void as an interim solution. 
Depending on the type of dispute resolution techniques, the cultural 
acceptance, and the skill of implementation, there is a strong potential to 
dramatically increase the speed of stabilization by resolving differences 
before they lead to additional strife in an already chaotic environment.  It is 
this combination of simplicity, efficiency, and light footprint that makes 
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